Sanctions or Tort? A Review of Ohio\u27s Treatment of Independent Causes of Action for Spoliation of Evidence by Hawal, Justin J.
Cleveland State University
EngagedScholarship@CSU
Cleveland State Law Review Law Journals
2014
Sanctions or Tort? A Review of Ohio's Treatment of
Independent Causes of Action for Spoliation of
Evidence
Justin J. Hawal
Follow this and additional works at: https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev
Part of the Torts Commons
How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at EngagedScholarship@CSU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Cleveland
State Law Review by an authorized editor of EngagedScholarship@CSU. For more information, please contact library.es@csuohio.edu.
Recommended Citation
Note, Sanctions or Tort? A Review of Ohio's Treatment of Independent Causes of Action for Spoliation of Evidence, 62 Clev. St. L.
Rev. 501 (2014)
 
 
 
501 
SANCTIONS OR TORT? A REVIEW OF OHIO’S 
TREATMENT OF INDEPENDENT CAUSES OF 
ACTION FOR SPOLIATION OF EVIDENCE 
JUSTIN J. HAWAL* 
 I. INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................... 502 
 II. HISTORY OF INDEPENDENT TORTS FOR SPOLIATION ............................... 504 
 III. TRADITIONAL METHODS OF COMBATTING SPOLIATION ......................... 507 
A. Sanctions ....................................................................................... 508 
1. Adverse Inference ................................................................. 508 
2. Default Judgment and Dismissal .......................................... 509 
3. Exclusion of Evidence and Testimony.................................. 510 
4. Monetary Sanctions .............................................................. 510 
B. Criminal Statutes ........................................................................... 511 
 IV. TYPES OF INDEPENDENT SPOLIATION TORTS .......................................... 512 
A. Intentional Spoliation .................................................................... 512 
1. First Party Intentional Spoliation .......................................... 512 
2. Third Party Intentional Spoliation ........................................ 513 
B. Negligent Spoliation ...................................................................... 514 
1. First Party Negligent Spoliation............................................ 514 
2. Third Party Negligent Spoliation .......................................... 515 
 V. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS....................................................................... 515 
A. Arguments in Favor of Independent Torts ..................................... 516 
1. Policy of Creating New Torts to Adequately Compensate 
Aggrieved Parties .................................................................. 516 
2. Deterrence ............................................................................. 517 
3. Judicial Integrity ................................................................... 519 
B. Arguments Against Separate Torts ................................................ 519 
1. Speculative Nature ................................................................ 519 
2. Derivative Tort Remedies ..................................................... 520 
3. Adequacy of Traditional Remedies....................................... 521 
4. Private Property Concerns .................................................... 522 
 VI. OHIO LAW .............................................................................................. 523 
 VII. ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ...................................................... 523 
A. Ohio Should Cease to Recognize Independent Torts for Intentional 
Spoliation of Evidence .................................................................. 524 
1. Recognizing Independent Torts for Intentional Spoliation Does 
Little to Further Deter the Willful Destruction of Evidence . 524 
2. The Derivative Nature of the Torts Poses Problems that Far 
Outweigh Any Benefits Associated with Recognizing 
Independent Torts for Intentional Spoliation ........................ 526 
                                                                                                                                         
 * J.D. expected, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, May 2014; B.A., Saint Louis 
University, 2010. Special thanks to my family and friends for their unending support and 
encouragement throughout this endeavor.  
1Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2014
502 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62:501 
3. Traditional Methods are Better at Accurately Compensating 
Victims of Intentional Spoliation Because the Tort is Inherently 
Speculative ............................................................................ 529 
B. Ohio Should Not Recognize Independent Torts for Negligent 
Spoliation of Evidence .................................................................. 531 
 VIII. CONCLUSION .......................................................................................... 532 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Spoliation of evidence has plagued the court system for centuries and threatens to 
undermine the right to a fair trial, which is an essential concept of American justice. 
Generally, spoliation refers to the “destruction or material alteration of evidence or 
the failure to preserve property for another’s use as evidence in pending or 
reasonably foreseeable litigation.”1 Courts universally recognize that spoliation “can 
destroy fairness and justice” by increasing the likelihood of erroneous decisions.2 
Spoliation can also increase the costs of litigation by forcing parties to reconstruct 
destroyed evidence or to produce other evidence, which may not be as accessible or 
persuasive.3  
For those reasons, courts have been attempting to find ways to combat spoliation 
ever since the English case of Armory v. Delamirie4 was decided in 1722.5 In that 
case, the adverse inference was introduced for the first time as a method to diminish 
the prejudicial effects that spoliation has on judicial decisions.6 The adverse 
inference allows the Judge to instruct the jury that altered or destroyed evidence is of 
the utmost importance and would have been unfavorable to the spoliating party’s 
case. 7 Since then, however, courts have developed a number of methods, other than 
the adverse inference, to combat spoliation.8 Most recently, some states’ courts have 
begun to develop independent tort claims for spoliation.9 
                                                                                                                                         
 1 West v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 167 F.3d 776, 779 (2d Cir. 1999) (citing 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1401 (6th ed. 1990)); see also Willard v. Caterpillar, Inc., 48 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 607 (Ct. App. 1995) (“Spoliation [of evidence] is the destruction or significant 
alteration of evidence, or the failure to preserve evidence for another’s use in pending or 
future litigation.”); Vesta Fire Ins. Corp. v. Milam & Co. Constr., Inc., 901 So. 2d 84 (Ala. 
2004) (“Spoliation [of evidence] is an attempt by a party to suppress or destroy material 
evidence favorable to the party’s adversary . . . [and] is sufficient foundation for an inference 
of the spoliator’s guilt or negligence.”). 
 2 See Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Super. Ct., 954 P.2d 511, 515 (Cal. 1998). 
 3 See id. 
 4 Armory v. Delamirie, 93 Eng. Rep. 664 (1722). 
 5 See Sean R. Levine, Spoliation of Evidence in West Virginia: Do Too Many Torts 
Spoliate the Broth?, 104 W. VA. L. REV. 419, 424 (2002). 
 6 See id. 
 7 See id. 
 8 See id. 
 9 See id. 
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Traditionally, courts have relied on various sanctions to combat the negative 
effects of spoliation,10 but a number of states’ courts have recently begun to explore 
separate tort claims to attempt to further combat and deter spoliation.11 Under the 
torts, the jury is left to confer the damages that would have been awarded in the 
underlying claim, had the evidence not been destroyed or altered.12  
Proponents of the various spoliation torts claim that they help to further deter the 
destruction of evidence as well as provide compensation to the victim where it 
otherwise may not have been available.13 Recognizing independent torts for 
spoliation, however, comes with significant problems. Perhaps the biggest of which, 
is the fact that there is frequently no way of knowing what the altered or destroyed 
evidence would have shown.14 Thus, the jury is left to speculate about the fact of 
harm and amount of damages.15 A second major criticism is that the torts, by their 
very nature, are derivative.16 Derivative torts are those that arise based on litigation 
related misconduct that occurred in an underlying lawsuit.17 Derivative torts violate 
the general policy against disturbing the finality of adjudication, and, as a result, 
invite spurious claims that prolong litigation.18 Lastly, many argue that independent 
torts for spoliation are unnecessary, as the majority of states have found that 
traditional methods of addressing spoliation are adequate to both deter and remedy 
the destruction of evidence.19 Ohio should join the majority of states in refusing to 
recognize independent torts for spoliation because the torts are inherently 
speculative, they invite spurious claims that prolong litigation, and because 
traditional methods of addressing spoliation adequately deter and provide a remedy.  
The Note that follows will explore the different variations of independent torts 
for spoliation as well as various policy arguments used by supporters and critics of 
the torts. Specifically, Section II of this Note will explore the history behind the 
recognition of independent torts for spoliation. Section III will explain the traditional 
remedies courts have used to combat spoliation of evidence, and Section IV will 
                                                                                                                                         
 10 See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 37. See also Shannon D. Hutchings, Tortious Liability for 
Spoliation of Evidence, 24 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 381, 400 (2000) (“Most States have a civil 
procedure rule modeled after Federal Rule 37.”). 
 11 Hutchings, supra note 10, at 383. 
 12 Id. 
 13 See Smith v. Super. Ct., 198 Cal. Rptr. 829, 832 (Ct. App. 1984) (finding “[f]or every 
wrong there is a remedy” and not allowing the tort “encourage[s] violence and invite[s] 
depredation”); see also Hannah v. Heeter, 584 S.E.2d 560, 566 (W. Va. 2003) (Recognizing 
that “[f]or every wrong there is supposed to be a remedy somewhere” and that “additional 
foundations of tort law are morality and deterrence.”). 
 14 Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Super. Ct., 954 P.2d 511, 518 (Cal. 1998) 
 15 Id. 
 16 See id. at 515 (recognizing longstanding policy against derivative tort remedies for 
litigation related misconduct). 
 17 See id. 
 18 See id. (finding derivative tort remedies encourage “a spiral of lawsuits”). 
 19 Rachel L. Sykes, A Phantom Menace: Spoliation of Evidence in Idaho Civil Cases, 42 
IDAHO L. REV. 821, 848 (2006). 
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detail the various forms of the spoliation tort. Section V of this paper will examine 
various policy arguments employed by supporters and detractors of the torts. Section 
VI will examine Ohio’s treatment of the various forms of the spoliation torts. Lastly, 
Section VII will analyze the merits of the various policy arguments as they apply to 
the different types of the spoliation tort. In addition, it will seek to show why Ohio 
should not recognize spoliation torts in any of their manifestations. 
II. HISTORY OF INDEPENDENT TORTS FOR SPOLIATION 
The recognition of independent torts for spoliation is a relatively new trend. In 
1984, in Smith v. Superior Court, California became the first state to recognize a 
separate cause of action for spoliation.20 In Smith, the plaintiff was driving her 
automobile when the left tire of an oncoming car flew off the vehicle and into the 
plaintiff’s windshield.21 The plaintiff was left permanently blind from the accident 
and filed suit against the dealer that customized the vehicle’s wheels before selling 
it.22 Following the accident, the vehicle was towed by the dealer and taken in for 
repairs.23 The dealer, however, was directed by the plaintiff’s attorney to maintain 
certain physical evidence for further investigation.24 Despite agreeing with the 
plaintiff’s attorney to preserve the evidence, the evidence was subsequently 
“destroyed, lost or transferred . . . making it impossible for the [plaintiff’s] experts to 
inspect and test those parts to pinpoint the cause of the failure of the wheel assembly 
on the van.”25 Since the destruction of the evidence made it impossible for the 
plaintiff to recover any damages in the underlying suit, the court allowed the plaintiff 
to bring a separate tort claim against the defendant for intentional spoliation. 26 In 
doing so, the court reasoned that no innocent victim should go uncompensated 
stating that: “[f]or every wrong there is a remedy.”27 The court also cited a recent 
trend toward recognizing new torts, including, inter alia, intentional infliction of 
emotional distress, invasion of privacy, and infliction of prenatal injuries as the 
impetus for allowing the new spoliation tort.28  
A few months later, in Bondu v. Gurvich, the Florida Third District Court of 
Appeals became one of the first courts to recognize an independent tort for the 
negligent destruction of evidence.29 In Bondu, the plaintiff was the spouse of a man 
                                                                                                                                         
 20 Smith v. Super. Ct., 198 Cal. Rptr. 829, 832 (Ct. App. 1984). 
 21 Id. at 831. 
 22 Id. 
 23 Id. 
 24 Id. 
 25 Id. 
 26 See generally id. 
 27 Id. 
 28 Id. at 832 (“When it becomes clear that the plaintiff’s interests are entitled to legal 
protection against the conduct of the defendant, the mere fact that the claim is novel will not 
itself operate as a bar to a remedy.”). 
 29 Bondu v. Gurvich, 473 So. 2d 1307 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984). 
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who died during heart surgery.30 After her husband’s death, she subsequently filed 
suit against the hospital and the anesthesiologists for negligence.31 During discovery, 
the plaintiff requested certain medical records that the hospital had apparently lost.32 
The plaintiff subsequently claimed that the loss of the medical records frustrated her 
ability to pursue her case.33 The Bondu Court allowed the plaintiff to proceed with 
her cause of action for negligent spoliation, finding that the hospital had a duty to 
“maintain medical records . . . imposed by administrative regulations.”34 In doing so, 
the court also reasoned that tort law is “anything but static” and that “new and 
nameless torts” are constantly being recognized to provide adequate compensation to 
those who have been wronged.35  
 Since the Smith and Bondu decisions, a number of variations of the spoliation 
tort have been developed, including first party intentional spoliation,36 third party 
intentional spoliation,37 first party negligent spoliation,38 and third party negligent 
spoliation.39 Several jurisdictions, including West Virginia, Alaska, Montana, the 
District of Columbia, Illinois, New Mexico, and Ohio recognize the spoliation torts 
in one or more of their manifestations.40 A majority of states, however, have refused 
                                                                                                                                         
 30 Id. at 1309. 
 31 Id. 
 32 Id. 
 33 Id. 
 34 Id. at 1312. 
 35 Id. (quoting PROSSER, supra note 35, at § 1, pp. 3-4 (4th ed. 1971)) (“New and nameless 
torts are being recognized constantly, and the progress of the common law is marked by many 
cases of first impression, in which the court has struck out boldly to create a new cause of 
action, where none has been recognized before. . . . The law of torts is anything but static, and 
the limits of its development are never set. When it becomes clear that the plaintiff’s interests 
are entitled to legal protection against the conduct of the defendant, the mere fact that the 
claim is novel will not itself operate as a bar to the remedy.”). 
 36 Nichols v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 6 P.3d 300 (Alaska 2000); Smith v. Howard 
Johnson Co., 615 N.E.2d 1037 (Ohio 1993); Hannah v. Heeter, 584 S.E.2d 560 (W. Va. 
2003). 
 37 Nichols, 6 P.3d 300; Oliver v. Stimson Lumber Co., 993 P.2d 11 (Mont. 1999); 
Coleman v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 905 P.2d 185 (N.M. 1995); Howard Johnson Co., 615 N.E.2d 
at 1038; Hannah, 584 S.E.2d 560. 
 38 Holmes v. Amerex Rent-A-Car, 710 A.2d 846 (D.C. 1998); Bondu, 473 So. 2d 1307. 
 39 Holmes, 710 A.2d at 846; Boyd v. Travelers Ins. Co., 652 N.E.2d 267 (Ill. 1995); 
Oliver, 993 P.2d at 18; Hannah, 584 S.E.2d 560. 
 40 Hannah, 584 S.E.2d 560 (recognizing independent tort for intentional spoliation and for 
some third party negligent spoliation, but rejecting first party negligent spoliation as 
independent tort); Nichols, 6 P.3d 300 (recognizing independent tort for first party and third 
party intentional spoliation but rejecting independent tort for first-party negligent spoliation); 
Oliver, 993 P.2d 11 (recognizing independent tort for negligent or intentional third party 
spoliation, but not for first party spoliation); Holmes, 710 A.2d 846 (recognizing independent 
tort for negligent third-party spoliation); Boyd, 652 N.E.2d 267 (recognizing independent tort 
of negligent spoliation against principal defendant’s liability insurer); Coleman, 905 P.2d 185 
(recognizing tort for intentional third party spoliation, but not for negligent spoliation); 
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to recognize separate causes of action for spoliation, regardless of what form the 
torts take.41 As these states have begun to note many of the problems associated with 
independent torts for spoliation, other states have begun to rethink their position on 
the torts. 
For example, in Cedars-Sinai Medical Center, just fourteen years after Smith, the 
Supreme Court of California overruled the Second District Court of Appeal’s 
decision to recognize separate causes of action for intentional spoliation.42 In 
Cedars-Sinai, the plaintiff was injured during birth and alleged that the defendant 
hospital intentionally destroyed evidence relevant to his malpractice action.43 The 
court recognized that “[t]he intentional destruction of evidence is a grave affront to 
the cause of justice and deserves our unqualified condemnation.”44 However, even 
though the court noted that spoliation destroys judicial integrity, it held that such 
destruction was not enough to justify recognizing a separate cause of action for 
spoliation.45 The court refrained from recognizing the spoliation torts because it 
found that they were inherently speculative, violated the policy against derivative 
tort remedies, and decided that traditional remedies were adequate to deter 
spoliation.46  
California was not the only state to reverse its stance on recognizing separate 
causes of action for spoliation.47 In 2005, in Martino v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., the 
Supreme Court of Florida followed suit and overruled the Third District Court of 
Appeal’s decision in Bondu, which recognized negligent spoliation as a separate 
tort.48 In Martino, the plaintiff’s arm was injured by a collapsible shopping cart 
                                                                                                                                         
Howard Johnson Co., 615 N.E.2d 1037 (recognizing independent tort for intentional first 
party and third party spoliation). 
 41 Gardner v. Blackston, 365 S.E.2d 545 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998) (rejecting claim for first-
party spoliation); Gribben v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 824 N.E.2d 349 (Ind. 2005) (rejecting 
claim for first-party spoliation); Meyn v. State, 594 N.W.2d 31 (Iowa 1999) (rejecting tort for 
third-party negligent spoliation and stating in dicta first-party claim also not cognizable); 
Dowdle Butane Gas Co. v. Moore, 831 So. 2d 1124 (Miss. 2002) (rejecting independent tort 
for intentional first-party or third-party spoliation); Oliver, 993 P.2d 11 (rejecting cause of 
action for first-party spoliation); Timber Tech Engineered Bldg. Prods. v. The Home Ins. Co., 
55 P.3d 952 (Nev. 2002) (rejecting cause of action for first-party spoliation); Rosenblit v. 
Zimmerman, 766 A.2d 749 (N.J. 2001) (rejecting independent tort for spoliation but 
permitting similar remedy under theory of fraudulent concealment); Ortega v. City of New 
York, 876 N.E.2d 1189 (N.Y. 2007) (rejecting independent tort for spoliation but recognizing 
action for negligently or intentionally impairing right to bring action against tortfeasor). 
 42 See Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Super. Ct., 954 P.2d 511 (Cal. 1998). 
 43 Id. at 512. 
 44 Id. 
 45 Id. at 515 (“That alone . . . is not enough to justify creating tort liability for such 
conduct.”). 
 46 See id. at 517 (“Weighing against our recognition of a tort cause of action for spoliation 
in this case are both the strong policy favoring use of nontort remedies rather than derivative 
tort causes of action to punish and correct litigation misconduct and the prohibition against 
attacking adjudications on the ground that evidence was falsified or destroyed.”). 
 47 Martino v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 908 So. 2d 342 (Fla. 2005). 
 48 Id. 
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while shopping at Wal-Mart.49 The plaintiff filed suit alleging Wal-Mart was 
negligent in maintaining its shopping carts.50 During discovery, the plaintiff 
requested the shopping cart and a copy of the video surveillance tape, but Wal-Mart 
was unable to produce the items.51 In declining to recognize a separate cause of 
action for negligent spoliation, the court held that traditional sanctions were 
sufficient to combat the destruction of evidence.52  
As can be seen from the cases above, two of the first states to recognize separate 
spoliation torts, California and Florida, began to notice many of the same difficulties 
that accompany recognizing other derivative torts.53 But on top of that, spoliation 
torts present an additional problem, mainly that there is often no way to tell what the 
evidence would have shown had it not been destroyed or altered.54 The inability to 
show exactly what the evidence would have proved, often times, makes it very 
difficult to show that its destruction was the proximate cause of the loss in the 
underlying case.55 Yet, despite all of the problems associated with independent torts 
for spoliation, there are still a few states, including Ohio, that have not retreated from 
their recognition of one or more of the spoliation torts.56  
III. TRADITIONAL METHODS OF COMBATTING SPOLIATION 
Traditionally, courts have used various sanctions and criminal statutes to combat 
the ongoing problem of spoliation. Courts generally have broad discretion in 
imposing sanctions for spoliation, which allows them to fashion appropriate 
remedies under specific circumstances.57 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, on 
which most state rules of civil procedure are based, also provide a wide variety of 
sanctions that could be imposed.58 In addition to sanctions, several states have 
passed statutes that make it a criminal act to destroy relevant evidence relating to 
                                                                                                                                         
 49 Id. at 344. 
 50 Id. 
 51 Id. 
 52 Id. at 346 (“[W]hen evidence [is] intentionally lost, misplaced, or destroyed by one 
party, trial courts [are] to rely on sanctions found in Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 
1.380(b)(2) . . . .”). 
 53 See Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Super. Ct., 954 P.2d 511 (Cal. 1998); see also Martino, 
908 So. 2d 342. 
 54 See Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr., 954 P.2d 511. 
 55 See id. 
 56 See supra note 40. 
 57 See Brian F. Stayton & Jesse L. Ray, Spoliation of Evidence: An Overview and 
Practical Suggestions, 24 CONSTR. LAW. 31, 32 (2004) (“Courts have exercised wide 
discretion in fashioning discovery sanctions for spoliation to fit the particular case.”). 
 58 Hutchings, supra note 10, at 400 (quoting Marrocco v. Gen. Motors Corp., 966 F.2d 
220, 225 (7th Cir. 1992)) (“Quite simply, sanctions can be employed for a wide array of 
purposes . . . .”). 
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pending or probable litigation.59 The following section will explore the sanctions and 
criminal statutes courts have traditionally used to combat spoliation. 
A. Sanctions 
Courts may impose a wide variety of sanctions for spoliation.60 The typical 
vehicle courts use to impose these sanctions is Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37.61 
A majority of states, including Ohio, also have a procedural rule modeled after 
Federal Rule 37.62 Federal Rule 37 is the primary rule by which courts sanction 
parties for failing to cooperate during the discovery process.63 Rule 37, however, 
only governs violations of a court order or discovery request and does not apply to 
spoliation that occurs prior to litigation.64 But, courts do have the inherent power to 
impose a wide variety of sanctions for pre-litigation spoliation and are generally 
given broad discretion to do so:65 Sanctions will only be reversed for clear abuse of 
discretion.66 Typical sanctions include, but are not limited to, the granting of an 
adverse inference, default judgment and dismissal of the case, exclusion of evidence 
or testimony, and monetary sanctions.67 Each of these sanctions will be described 
and discussed below.  
1. Adverse Inference 
Perhaps the most effective and valuable evidentiary sanction designed to combat 
spoliation is the adverse evidentiary inference. Where evidence critical to the 
plaintiff’s case has been destroyed or concealed by a defendant, courts will often 
permit an adverse inference to be drawn against the spoliating party.68 The party 
whose evidence has been destroyed or altered is allowed to introduce evidence of the 
allegedly destroyed materials.69 The alleged victim bears the burden of proving that 
the materials were altered or destroyed.70 If the judge finds that the opposing party 
                                                                                                                                         
 59 See ALA. CODE § 13A-10-129 (1982); ALASKA STAT. § 11.56.610 (1996); N.Y. PENAL 
LAW § 215.40 (McKinney 1988); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-221.1 (1993); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 2921.12 (West 2013); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5105 (West 2014); TEX. PENAL CODE 
ANN. § 37.09 (West 2013); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-8-510 (repealed 2001); VA. CODE ANN. 
§ 18.2-460 (2013); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 946.60 (West 2013). 
 60 Hutchings, supra note 10, at 400; see also Stayton & Ray, supra note 57, at 32 (“Courts 
have exercised a wide discretion in fashioning discovery sanctions for spoliation to fit the 
particular case.”). 
 61 See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 37. Hutchings, supra note 10, at 400. 
 62 Hutchings, supra note 10, at 400. See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 37. 
 63 See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 37 
 64 Hutchings, supra note 10, at 401. 
 65 Id. 
 66 Id. 
 67 See FED. R. CIV. P. 37; see also OHIO R. CIV. P. 37. 
 68 See Hutchings, supra note 10, at 405. 
 69 See Levine, supra note 5, at 429. 
 70 Id. 
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altered or destroyed evidence, he may instruct the jury to infer that the altered or 
destroyed evidence would have been unfavorable to the spoliating party.71  
There are three main rationales for allowing the adverse inference to be used 
against a spoliating party. First, it deters intentional spoliation by placing the risk of 
an adverse inference on the spoliator.72 Second, if a party intentionally destroys 
evidence, that evidence was likely detrimental to the party’s case.73 Lastly, the 
adverse inference protects the non-spoliating party by remedying the wrong 
committed by the spoliator.74 
Jurisdictions are split in their determinations of when granting an adverse 
inference is appropriate, but most agree that an adverse inference should not be 
granted where the spoliator is able to show that the altered or destroyed evidence is 
of little value.75 Jurisdictions also consider the level of culpability of the spoliator.76 
Courts will generally find the granting of an adverse inference appropriate only if the 
following elements are satisfied: “(1) an act of destruction; (2) discoverability of the 
evidence; (3) an intent to destroy the evidence; (4) occurrence of the act at a time 
after suit has been filed, or, if before filing, at a time when the finding is fairly 
perceived as imminent.”77 Although Ohio has held that the adverse inference may be 
used in cases of gross negligence,78 most states will only give an adverse inference 
for evidence that has been destroyed intentionally.79 Thus, the adverse inference 
generally does not serve as a remedy for parties whose evidence was negligently 
destroyed or altered.80 The adverse inference is also not a remedy for those parties 
whose evidence was spoliated by a person who is not a party to the suit and who has 
no stake in the litigation.81 
2. Default Judgment and Dismissal 
Another option courts have when deciding cases in which evidence has been 
destroyed or tampered with is to dismiss the entire cause of action or to enter a 
                                                                                                                                         
 71 See Stayton & Ray, supra note 57, at 31 (An example of a typical spoliation inference 
jury instruction: “[w]hen evidence is within the control of a party whose natural interest it 
would be to produce that evidence, and that party destroys the evidence without adequate 
cause, it may be inferred that such evidence would be unfavorable to that party.”). 
 72 See Laurie Kindel & Kai Richter, Spoliation of Evidence: Will the New Millennium See 
a Further Expansion of Sanctions for the Improper Destruction of Evidence?, 27 WM. 
MITCHELL L. REV. 687, 695 (2000). 
 73 Id. 
 74 Id. 
 75 Levine, supra note 5, at 428-29. 
 76 Id. 
 77 Id.  
 78 See Roetenberger v. Christ Hosp., 839 N.E.2d 441, 448 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005) (leaving 
open possibility of adverse inference being used in cases of gross negligence). 
 79 Levine, supra note 5, at 428-29. 
 80 See id. at 429. 
 81 See id. 
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default judgment for the non-spoliating party.82 Since dismissal is an extremely 
severe penalty, however, it is reserved for the most egregious acts of spoliation.83 
Dismissal may not be imposed if there is a “lesser, but equally efficient remedy 
available.”84 Typically, this sanction is imposed on parties that have destroyed 
evidence intentionally and willfully for the purpose of weakening the opposing 
party’s case.85 Thus, “parties that intentionally spoliate evidence do so at 
considerable peril to their case.”86 Like the adverse inference, however, default 
judgment and dismissal generally do not apply to parties who spoliate evidence 
negligently or to third party spoliators with no stake in the litigation.87 
3. Exclusion of Evidence and Testimony 
Since dismissal and default judgment are such extreme penalties, the Federal 
Rules, and most states, also provide courts with the power to exclude spoliated 
evidence and testimony that is related to that evidence.88 Although courts are 
somewhat reluctant to dismiss a case or enter default judgment when spoliation has 
occurred, exclusion of spoliated evidence and related testimony often achieves the 
same goal, without the harsh consequences of dismissal.89 For example, a party that 
has spoliated evidence will often be prohibited from offering expert testimony 
related to the piece of evidence in question.90 But, because the plaintiff bears the 
burden of proof on most issues, exclusion of evidence and related testimony is 
generally not as effective a remedy where evidence has been totally destroyed 
because total destruction makes it very difficult for the plaintiff to prove that the 
evidence was favorable.91 Thus, for example, there is less of a need for the spoliating 
party to present an expert witness to rebut the non-spoliating party’s claim, if the 
non-spoliating party cannot prove what the evidence would have shown in the first 
place.92  
4. Monetary Sanctions 
The Federal Rules, and most states, also allow courts to require a spoliator to pay 
money for the destruction, alteration, or concealment of evidence.93 Monetary 
sanctions may be assessed in a number of situations. Some of the most common 
                                                                                                                                         
 82 Id. at 693. 
 83 Id. 
 84 Id. 
 85 Id. 
 86 Id. 
 87 See id. 
 88 See FED. R. CIV. P. 37; see also Kindel & Richter, supra note 72, at 694. 
 89 Kindel & Richter, supra note 72, at 694. 
 90 See id. 
 91 Id. 
 92 See id. 
 93 Id. 
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situations include: assessing fees and costs associated with arguing evidentiary 
motions and motions for sanctions, discovery costs associated with willful 
destruction or concealment, and costs associated with exhausting a court’s time and 
resources.94 In cases of egregious acts of spoliation, the court may also multiply 
these monetary penalties in order to provide an adequate punishment to the 
spoliator.95 Thus, monetary sanctions can be quite substantial if the spoliator’s 
conduct is particularly flagrant.96 As a result, these punitive fines can operate as a 
particularly good deterrent to potential spoliators.97  
B. Criminal Statutes 
A number of states, including Ohio, also have criminal statutes that make it a 
crime to destroy, alter, or conceal evidence.98 For example, Ohio makes it a felony of 
the third degree to “alter, destroy, conceal, or remove any record, document, or 
thing, with purpose to impair its value or availability as evidence in such proceeding 
or investigation.”99 Ohio also makes it a crime to “[m]ake, present, or use any 
record, document, or thing, knowing it to be false and with the purpose to mislead a 
public official.”100 These statutes are designed to deter spoliation and apply equally 
to parties involved in the litigation and third parties.101 However, the alleged 
spoliator must know “that an official proceeding or investigation is in progress, or is 
about to be or likely to be instituted.”102  
Although criminal statutes are designed to deter and punish spoliation, some 
commentators have suggested that, in practice, prosecutors are reluctant to pursue 
criminal charges against spoliators in civil litigation because they are busy 
prosecuting “real crimes.”103 The idea is that, in a civil case, punishment for 
spoliation is more properly handled by the trial court judge.104 This view is just one 
reason why some commentators have supported creating various types of 
independent torts for spoliation.  
                                                                                                                                         
 94 Id.  
 95 Id. at 695-96. 
 96 Id. at 696. 
 97 See id. 
 98 See Hutchings, supra note 10, at 399. 
 99 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2921.12 (West 2013). 
 100 Id. 
 101 Levine, supra note 5, at 432 (“Another remedy that may persuade potential spoliators to 
act otherwise is the fact that many jurisdictions have obstruction of justice statutes that cover 
spoliation of evidence.”). 
 102 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2921.12 (West 2013). 
 103 Jonathan Judge, Reconsidering Spoliation: Common-Sense Alternatives to the 
Spoliation Tort, 2001 WIS. L. REV. 441, 447 (2001) (“[C]ommentators have struggled to find 
cases where a spoliator has been criminally prosecuted for destroying evidence in a civil case. 
Part of the explanation lies with prosecutors, who are overwhelmed dealing with ‘real crime,’ 
and who no doubt see civil litigation spoliation as the trial judge’s problem.”). 
 104 Id.  
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IV. TYPES OF INDEPENDENT SPOLIATION TORTS 
When evidence relevant to litigation is destroyed or lost the consequences on the 
party that the evidence favored can be severe. In some cases, the loss of a single 
piece of critical evidence can prevent a party from proving a valid claim or defense. 
Traditionally, as discussed above, courts have used sanctions, ranging from 
discovery sanctions and presumptions to default, in an attempt to combat the harmful 
effects of spoliation.105 Recently, however, a number of states have addressed 
whether to recognize several variations of independent torts for spoliation.106 These 
variations include first party intentional spoliation, third party intentional spoliation, 
first party negligent spoliation, and third party negligent spoliation.107 The following 
section will explore the different causes of action recognized in various states for 
spoliation of evidence.  
A. Intentional Spoliation 
Intentional spoliation refers to evidence that has been destroyed, altered, or 
concealed willfully for the purpose of disrupting the party’s case.108 It can refer to 
evidence willfully destroyed, altered, or concealed by either a party to the litigation 
or a third party that has undertaken a duty to preserve the evidence.109 The following 
section will explore the two different types of intentional spoliation. 
1. First Party Intentional Spoliation 
A number of states, including Ohio, have recognized a tort for first party 
intentional spoliation of evidence.110 First party intentional spoliation refers to the 
willful destruction or alteration of evidence by a person who is a party to the 
litigation for the purpose of defeating another party’s recovery.111 Generally, states 
recognizing first party intentional spoliation agree that the elements include: (1) 
pending or probable litigation involving the plaintiff; (2) knowledge on the part of 
the defendant that litigation exists or is probable; (3) willful destruction of evidence 
by defendant designed to disrupt the plaintiff’s case; (4) disruption of the plaintiff’s 
case; and (5) damages proximately caused by the defendant’s acts.112 
                                                                                                                                         
 105 See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 37. 
 106 See supra notes 44-45. 
 107 See supra notes 44-48. 
 108 See supra note 1. 
 109 See Smith v. Howard Johnson Co., 615 N.E.2d 1037 (Ohio 1993) (recognizing 
independent tort for first party intentional spoliation and third party intentional spoliation); see 
also Nichols v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 6 P.3d 300 (Alaska 2000); Hannah v. Heeter, 584 
S.E.2d 560 (W. Va. 2003) (recognizing first and third party intentional spoliation). 
 110 See Howard Johnson Co., 615 N.E.2d at 1038; see also Nichols, 6 P. 3d 300; Hannah, 
584 S.E.2d 560. 
 111 See Coleman v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 905 P.2d 185, 189 (N.M. 1995), overruled by 
Delgado v. Phelps Dodge Chino, Inc., 34 P.3d 1148 (N.M. 2001) (intentional spoliation is “the 
intentional destruction, mutilation, or significant alteration of potential evidence for the 
purpose of defeating another person’s recovery in a civil action”).  
 112 Howard Johnson Co., 615 N.E.2d at 1037. 
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Ohio is one of only three states that recognize a cognizable tort for first party 
intentional spoliation.113 The other two states are West Virginia and Alaska.114 These 
states have traditionally given three main rationales for recognition of the tort: (1) 
“Permitting the independent tort action promotes the desire to protect testimonial 
candor and the integrity of the adversarial system;” (2) “the tort protects the probable 
expectation of a favorable judgment or defense in future litigation;” and (3) 
traditional remedies such as sanctions are not effective enough to deter spoliation.115 
A majority of courts that have considered a tort for first-party intentional spoliation, 
however, have rejected these rationales as insufficient to warrant recognition of the 
tort.116 
2. Third Party Intentional Spoliation 
Third party intentional spoliation refers to evidence that is willfully destroyed or 
altered by an individual who is not a party to the underlying suit.117 The elements of 
third party intentional spoliation include: (1) the existence of a potential civil action; 
(2) a legal or contractual duty resulting from a written contract, special relationship, 
or court order, to preserve evidence which is relevant to that action; (3) destruction 
of that evidence; (4) significant impairment in the ability to prove the potential civil 
action; (5) a causal connection between the destruction of the evidence and the 
inability to prove the lawsuit; (6) a significant possibility of success of the potential 
civil action if the evidence were available; and (7) damages.118 
Generally, states have been less reluctant to recognize independent torts for third 
party spoliation.119 Courts have determined that the main distinction between first 
and third party spoliation is the disparity in sanctions available for third party 
spoliators.120 Although some sanctions are available against third parties, including 
monetary and contempt sanctions, many sanctions, such as the adverse inference and 
most discovery sanctions, are unavailable for use against a third party.121 Thus, states 
recognizing third party intentional spoliation have reasoned that allowing a cause of 
action will not only help deter spoliation, but will also create a remedy against a 
third party where one would not otherwise be available.122 
                                                                                                                                         
 113 Id. 
 114 Nichols, 6 P.3d 300; Hannah, 584 S.E.2d 560. 
 115 See Dowdle Butane Gas Co. v. Moore, 831 So. 2d 1124, 1130 (Miss. 2002). 
 116 See supra note 40. 
 117 See Hannah, 584 S.E.2d at 571. 
 118 See Village of Roselle v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 859 N.E.2d 1 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006). 
 119 Id. 
 120 See Hannah, 584 S.E.2d at 571. 
 121 Stayton & Ray, supra note 57, at 31 (“The distinction between parties and nonparties is 
premised on the idea that other remedies, such as spoliation inferences and discovery 
sanctions, influence only litigants and leave third-party spoliators undeterred.”). 
 122 See Hannah, 584 S.E.2d at 571 (“[R]ecovery under a separate tort is necessary because 
a third party is not subject to an adverse inference instruction or discovery sanctions. In regard 
to a party to a civil action, we believe that intentional spoliation of evidence is misconduct of 
such a serious nature, the existing remedies are not a sufficient response.”). 
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B. Negligent Spoliation 
In Bondu v. Gurvich, Florida became one of the first states to recognize the tort 
of negligent spoliation.123 The Bondu Court noted that it would not need to “strike 
out boldly” in creating a new tort because negligent spoliation could be stated under 
existing negligence law.124 As the negligent spoliation tort began to evolve, however, 
Florida courts began to recognize additional elements and no longer stated the claim 
as a simple negligence cause of action.125 Some states do, however, hold that a claim 
for negligent spoliation may be brought under existing negligence law.126 The 
following section will explore the two different causes of action for negligent 
spoliation. 
1. First Party Negligent Spoliation 
Several jurisdictions, at one point or another, have recognized a cause of action 
for first party negligent spoliation.127 The majority of state courts that have addressed 
the issue, however, have rejected first party negligent spoliation as a separate tort.128 
Still, other states’ appellate courts have been split as to whether first party negligent 
spoliation is a cognizable claim.129 
States recognizing a separate cause of action for first party negligent spoliation 
have generally stated the elements of the claim as follows: (1) existence of potential 
civil action; (2) legal or contractual duty to preserve evidence which is relevant to 
potential litigation; (3) destruction of that evidence; (4) significant impairment in 
ability to prove the lawsuit; (5) causal relationship between evidence destruction and 
ability to prove lawsuit; and (6) damages.130 
                                                                                                                                         
 123 See generally Bondu v. Gurvich, 473 So. 2d 1307 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984). 
 124 Id. at 1312. 
 125 See Cont’l Ins. Co. v. Herman, 576 So. 2d 313, 315 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990). 
 126 Boyd v. Travelers Ins. Co., 652 N.E.2d 267 (Ill. 1995). 
 127 Foster v. Lawrence Mem’l Hosp., 809 F. Supp. 831 (D. Kan. 1992) (applying Kansas 
law); Holmes v. Amerex Rent-A-Car, 710 A.2d 846 (D.C. 1998); Bondu, 473 So. 2d 1307. 
 128 See Sykes, supra note 19, at 848 (quoting Gribben v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 824 N.E.2d 
349, 355 (Ind. 2005)) (“Most [states] hold that available remedies fairly compensate parties 
harmed. Notwithstanding the policy considerations involved, they are ‘minimized by existing 
remedies and outweighed by the attendant disadvantages.’”). 
 129 See Gicking v. Joyce Int’l Inc., 33 Pa. D. & C. 4th 208 (C.P. 1996) (recognizing cause 
of action for negligent spoliation); see also Swick v. N.Y. Times Co., 815 A.2d 508 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003) (holding trial court erred in dismissing cause of action for 
negligent spoliation); Manorcare Health Serv., Inc. v. Osmose Wood Preserving, Inc., 764 
A.2d 475 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) (recognizing cause of action for negligent 
spoliation). But see Rhoads v. Pottsville Hosp., 31 Pa. D. & C. 4th 500 (C.P. 1996) (declining 
to recognize a cause of action for negligent spoliation); Urban v. Dollar Bank, 34 Pa. D. & C. 
4th 11 (C.P. 1996) (declining to recognize either intentional or negligent spoliation). 
 130 Silhan v. Allstate Ins. Co., 236 F. Supp. 2d 1303 (N.D. Fla. 2002) (applying Florida 
law). 
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Like simple negligence claims, states that recognize claims for first party 
negligent spoliation hold that the party must have a duty to preserve the evidence.131 
Furthermore, no general duty to preserve exists, but a duty can arise out of an 
agreement or contract, a statutory requirement, or an assumption of the duty by 
affirmative conduct.132 If one of these duties applies, then a defendant owes a duty of 
care to preserve evidence if a reasonable person in the defendant’s position should 
have foreseen that the evidence was material to a potential civil action.133 
2. Third Party Negligent Spoliation 
Third party negligent spoliation is committed when a person or entity, that is not 
a party to the underlying cause of action, has a duty to preserve evidence and fails to 
do so.134 Several states, at one point or another, have recognized a cause of action for 
third party negligent spoliation.135 Although very similar to first party negligent 
spoliation, the elements of a cause of action for third party negligent spoliation differ 
slightly. Most commonly, the elements are stated as follows: (1) the existence of a 
pending or potential civil action; (2) the alleged spoliator had actual knowledge of 
the pending or potential civil action; (3) a duty to preserve evidence arising from a 
contract, agreement, statute, administrative rule, voluntary assumption of duty, or 
other special circumstances; (4) spoliation of the evidence; (5) the spoliated evidence 
was vital to a party’s ability to prevail in the pending or potential civil action; and (6) 
damages.136 
Once the first five elements are satisfied, there arises a rebuttable presumption 
that, but for the fact of the spoliation, the party injured would have prevailed in the 
pending or potential litigation.137 The third party must then overcome that rebuttable 
presumption by introducing evidence that would support a finding that the opposing 
party would not have won even if the spoliated evidence had been available.138 If the 
defendant is able to rebut the presumption, the plaintiff must convince the jury that 
the spoliated evidence was so important to his case that, without the evidence, the 
claim would not have survived a motion for summary judgment.139  
V. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 
Both proponents and detractors of the spoliation torts are able to assert valid 
policy arguments for their respective positions. Specifically, there are seven different 
                                                                                                                                         
 131 Andersen v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 793 N.E.2d 962 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003); Wilhite v. 
Thompson, 962 So. 2d 493 (La. Ct. App. 2007). 
 132 See Andersen, 793 N.E.2d at 966; Wilhite, 962 So. 2d at 498. 
 133 Andersen, 793 N.E.2d at 966. 
 134 See Oliver v. Stimson Lumber Co., 993 P.2d 11, 19-20 (Mont. 1999). 
 135 Holmes v. Amrex Rent-A-Car, 180 F. 3d 294 (D.C. Cir. 1999); Hannah v. Heeter, 584 
S.E.2d 560 (W. Va. 2003); Oliver, 993 P.2d 11; Boyd v. Travelers Ins. Co., 652 N.E.2d 267 
(Ill. 1995). 
 136 Hannah, 584 S.E.2d at 570. 
 137 Id. 
 138 Id. 
 139 Id. 
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policy arguments that courts have traditionally analyzed when deciding whether to 
recognize spoliation as a separate cause of action. These policy arguments will be 
explained in the section that follows. 
A. Arguments in Favor of Independent Torts 
There are three main policy arguments employed to advance the creation of 
separate causes of action for spoliation. First, courts are constantly recognizing new 
and nameless torts in order to properly compensate victims who ought to be afforded 
protection by the law.140 Second, creating a separate spoliation torts deters future 
spoliators from destroying evidence.141 Lastly, independent torts for spoliation 
promote judicial integrity.142 The reasoning behind these policy arguments will be 
explained below. 
1. Policy of Creating New Torts to Adequately Compensate Aggrieved Parties 
One of the main arguments used to advance the creation of separate causes of 
action for spoliation is that courts are continually recognizing new tort actions to 
remedy the “unreasonable interference with the interests of others.”143 Tort law is 
“anything but static” and there are no limitations placed on its growth.144 
Furthermore, “[w]hen it becomes clear that the plaintiff’s interests are entitled to 
legal protection against the conduct of the defendant, the mere fact that the claim is 
novel will not of itself operate as a bar to the remedy.”145 The primary rationale for 
the constant evolution of tort law is that it allows a possible remedy where one may 
not otherwise be available.146 Furthermore, courts have reasoned that an innocent 
victim should “not be forced to suffer as a result of the spoliator’s actions.”147 
 This rationale was the main argument employed by the court in Smith v. 
Superior Court, the first case to hold that an independent tort existed for intentional 
spoliation.148 The court in that case held that “California has long recognized ‘[f]or 
                                                                                                                                         
 140 See Smith v. Super. Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 3d 829, 832 (Ct. App. 1984) (quoting 
PROSSER, supra note 35, at § 1, pp. 3-4 (4th ed. 1971)) (“When it becomes clear that the 
plaintiff’s interests are entitled to legal protection against the conduct of the defendant, the 
mere fact that the claim is novel will not itself operate as a bar to a remedy.”). 
 141 See id. at 836 (finding that not allowing tort “encourage[s] violence and invite[s] 
depredation”). 
 142 See Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Super. Court, 954 P.2d 511 (Cal. 1998) (“Destroying 
evidence can destroy fairness and justice, for it increases the risk of an erroneous 
decision . . . .”). 
 143 Smith, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 832; see also Levine, supra note 5, at 440-41. 
 144 Levine, supra note 5, at 440.  
 145 Id. at 440-41 (quoting PROSSER, supra note 35, at § 1, pp. 3-4 (4th ed. 1971)). 
 146 See Smith, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 832; see also Hannah v. Heeter, 584 S.E.2d 560, 566 (W. 
Va. 2003). 
 147 Stefan Rubin, Tort Reform: A Call for Florida to Scale Back its Independent Tort for 
the Spoliation of Evidence, 51 FLA. L. REV. 345, 365 (1999). 
 148 See Smith, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 832 (quoting PROSSER, supra note 35, at § 1, pp. 3-4) 
(“Prosser instructs us that: ‘New and nameless torts are being recognized constantly, and the 
progress of the common law is marked by many cases of first impression, in which the court 
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every wrong there is a remedy,’ and has allowed for new torts through legislative 
and judicial process.”149 As the Smith court recognized, examples of such new torts 
include: intentional infliction of emotional distress, invasion of privacy, infliction of 
prenatal injuries, and the alienation of the affections of a parent.150 
Although courts have used this rationale for all forms of the spoliation tort, 
courts have indicated that this rationale applies with more force to third party 
spoliators than to first party spoliators.151 The rationale is more fitting for third party 
spoliators because traditional sanctions, such as adverse inferences and default 
judgment, are not available against third parties who have no stake in the 
litigation.152 Thus, to prevent innocent victims of spoliation from going 
uncompensated, some jurisdictions have found it necessary to recognize independent 
torts for spoliation caused by third parties. 
2. Deterrence 
Another major argument in favor of creating separate causes of action for 
spoliation is that the torts help to further deter the destruction of evidence.153 Courts 
universally condemn spoliation as destroying the integrity of the justice system.154 
However, they disagree as to whether traditional methods of combatting spoliation 
are adequate to deter future destruction of evidence.155 For example, in Smith v. 
Superior Court, the court found that to deny a party the opportunity to bring separate 
torts for spoliation is “[t]o deny the injured party the right to recover any actual 
damages . . . encourage[ing] violence and invite[ing] depredation.”156 As did the 
Smith Court, the majority of courts that have recognized independent causes of 
action for spoliation reason that traditional sanctions and criminal statutes are 
inadequate to deter the destruction of evidence.157 Proponents of the torts claim that 
if the spoliated evidence is extremely detrimental to a litigant’s case, the rewards for 
                                                                                                                                         
has struck out boldly to create a cause of action, where none had been recognized 
before . . . .’”). 
 149 Id. 
 150 Id. 
 151 See Levine, supra note 5, at 435. 
 152 Id. 
 153 Smith, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 836; see also Dowdle Butane Gas Co., Inc. v. Moore, 831 So. 
2d 1124, 1130 (Miss. 2002).  
 154 See Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Super. Ct., 954 P.2d 511, 515 (Cal. 1998). 
 155 Steffen Nolte, The Spoliation Tort: An Approach to Underlying Principles, 26 ST. 
MARY’S L.J. 351, 402 (1995) (“[C]onventional remedies such as the adverse inference or court 
sanctions provide only limited deterrence to willful spoliation.”). 
 156 Smith, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 836. 
 157 Sykes, supra note 19, at 846-47 (“Since penalties are often lenient, the ‘bad man’ will 
spoliate evidence because the harshness of the penalties do not outweigh the advantage he will 
gain by spoliating. Because of this unfortunate reality, commentators argue that the adoption 
of an independent tort of spoliation will curtail such conduct and provide harsher penalties.”). 
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spoliation far outweigh the risks posed by traditional remedies.158 One commentator 
has even stated that “[t]he bad faith spoliator has nothing to lose and much to 
gain.”159 Thus, courts have reasoned that allowing independent torts for spoliation 
increases the severity of punishment and therefore adds greater deterrence than 
traditional remedies.160 
Scholars recognize that, at least in theory, sanctions are the most “diverse and 
tailored remedies.”161 Some, however, have suggested that, in reality, sanctions have 
limitations on their usefulness and that these limitations also reduce their deterrent 
effects.162 Specifically, sanctions under the Federal Rules and most state laws can 
only be awarded for violations of a court order or subpoena.163 As a result, 
proponents of the spoliation torts argue that courts are powerless to punish spoliation 
that occurs prior to the grant of a motion to compel.164 Discovery sanctions also do 
not apply to spoliation that occurs prior to the commencement of litigation.165 Thus, 
supporters of the spoliation tort argue that traditional sanctions only encourage a 
spoliator to destroy the evidence as quickly as possible, rather than to preserve it.166 
Supporters of the spoliation torts also argue that criminal statutes addressing the 
destruction of evidence are not as effective in deterring spoliation as one would 
think. In actuality, “commentators have struggled to find cases where a spoliator has 
been criminally prosecuted for destroying evidence in a civil case.”167 Instead, they 
have found that prosecutors are too busy dealing with “real crimes” and view 
spoliation as the “trial judge’s problem.”168 These considerations have led some 
                                                                                                                                         
 158 Nolte, supra note 155, at 401 (“When particular evidence is severely detrimental to a 
party’s case, there may be little incentive to preserve the evidence if production would cause 
the party to lose” and “a risk benefit analysis might encourage an adverse party to choose the 
spoliation alternative.”). 
 159 Id.  
 160 Id. at 402 (“The potential for general or punitive damages significantly increases the 
severity of punishment, thereby increasing the liability a potential spoliator expects.”). 
 161 Judge, supra note 103, at 446. 
 162 Id.; Stayton & Ray, supra note 57, at 32 (“There are two inherent limits to the 
effectiveness of the discovery sanctions as a remedy for spoliation: they can be applied only 
after litigation has commenced and only to parties in a case.”). 
 163 Judge, supra note 103, at 446. 
 164 Id. 
 165 Id. 
 166 Id. (“[T]he primary message sent to the potential spoliator . . . may not be to preserve 
evidence, but rather to destroy it as quickly as possible.”). 
 167 Id. at 447; see also Nolte, supra note 155, at 355 (“Criminal obstruction-of-justice 
statutes provide only theoretical deterrence, as the absence of case law demonstrates . . . .”). 
 168 Judge, supra note 103, 447 (“Part of the explanation lies with prosecutors, who are 
overwhelmed dealing with ‘real crime,’ and who no doubt see civil litigation spoliation as the 
trial judge's problem.”); see also Sykes, supra note 19, at 847 (“Since today's criminal justice 
system is overwhelmed by felony cases and pursuit of the ‘big fish,’ there is little time or 
resources to expend on spoliation prosecutions.”) 
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states to adopt the spoliation torts in order to provide additional deterrence to the 
destruction of evidence.  
3. Judicial Integrity 
Another policy argument typically made by proponents of spoliation torts is that 
they promote judicial integrity. The judicial integrity argument is closely related to 
the compensation and deterrence rationales discussed above. Courts universally 
recognize that spoliation threatens the integrity of the judicial system because it 
increases the chances of erroneous decisions.169 Supporters of the torts argue that 
allowing separate causes of action for spoliation will increase the judicial integrity of 
the courts by deterring future spoliation, and thus, by decreasing the chances of 
wrong decisions.170 Furthermore, these supporters argue that judicial integrity will 
also be served by creating a remedy for every wrong committed against a victim who 
the law affords protection.171  
B. Arguments Against Separate Torts 
Although proponents of independent torts for spoliation advance several valid 
arguments, critics of the torts also have legitimate policy arguments that call into 
question the wisdom of recognizing these torts. The three most prominent arguments 
espoused by courts and commentators are that the spoliation torts are inherently 
speculative, they violate the policy against recognizing derivative tort remedies, and 
that traditional remedies are adequate to both deter and remedy spoliation.172 These 
arguments as well as others will be discussed below. 
1. Speculative Nature 
One major problem courts have with recognizing independent torts for spoliation 
is that the torts, by their very nature, are inherently speculative.173 In other words, 
even if a party can prove that evidence was intentionally destroyed, the court can 
never be certain as to what that evidence would have shown and how much the 
evidence would have weighed in the spoliation victim’s favor.174 Without knowing 
the exact contents of the evidence, it is impossible for a jury to meaningfully assess 
what role the missing evidence would have had.175 Thus, the jury is left to speculate 
                                                                                                                                         
 169 See Rubin, supra note 147, at 364. 
 170 See Smith v. Super. Ct., 198 Cal. Rptr. 829, 836 (“Deterrence is an important policy 
consideration for allowing the maintenance of suits when damages cannot be shown with 
certainty.”). 
 171 See id. at 832. 
 172 Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Super. Ct., 954 P.2d 511, 515 (Cal. 1998) (“Three concerns in 
particular stand out here: the conflict between a tort remedy for intentional first party 
spoliation and the policy against creating derivative tort remedies for litigation-related 
misconduct; the strength of existing nontort remedies for spoliation; and the uncertainty of the 
fact of harm in spoliation cases.”). 
 173 See id. at 518. 
 174 See id. 
 175 Id. 
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as to what the missing evidence would have shown and what effect it would have 
had on the outcome of the underlying litigation.176 One court went so far as to say: 
It is impossible to know what the destroyed evidence would have shown. 
. . . It would seem to be sheer guesswork, even presuming that the 
destroyed evidence went against the spoliator, to calculate what it would 
have contributed to the plaintiff’s success on the merits of the underlying 
lawsuit. . . . The lost evidence may have concerned a relevant, but 
relatively trivial matter. If evidence would not have helped to establish 
plaintiff’s case, an award of damages for its destruction would work a 
windfall for the plaintiff.177 
Courts and commentators have also noted that, in addition to receiving a possible 
windfall, the inherently speculative nature of the torts may lead to erroneous 
decisions and inconsistency.178 Furthermore, along with the speculative nature as to 
whether the plaintiff’s case was in fact harmed by the spoliation, speculation also 
exists as to the amount of damages that the original jury would have awarded absent 
the spoliation.179 Thus, critics of the torts argue that they cannot accurately 
compensate victims or “correct errors in the determination of the issues in the 
underlying litigation.”180 
2. Derivative Tort Remedies 
Traditionally, courts have followed a policy of not recognizing derivative torts, 
which are those based on litigation-related misconduct in an underlying case.181 The 
rational behind the courts’ non-recognition of derivative tort remedies is rooted in 
procedural and policy considerations that are not present in traditional tort actions.182 
In particular, courts have generally recognized that derivative tort remedies based on 
litigation misconduct work to further prolong litigation.183 For example, the Supreme 
Court of California has found that creating independent torts for spoliation 
“encourages a spiral of lawsuits” because allowing derivative tort remedies increases 
                                                                                                                                         
 176 Id. at 518. 
 177 See id. at 518-19. 
 178 See Stayton & Ray, supra note 57, at 33. 
 179 See id. (The jury in an independent tort action would not only have to infer what the 
destroyed evidence might have proven but also have to determine what the original jury might 
have given the nonspoliating party had this evidence been presented to the original jury.). 
 180 Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr., 954 P.2d at 519. 
 181 See id.; see also Levine, supra note 5, at 441 (recognizing derivative torts as 
inefficient). 
 182 Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr., 954 P.2d at 515 (“[The] inquiry into whether to create a tort 
remedy for the intentional spoliation of evidence must begin with the recognition that using 
tort law to correct misconduct arising during litigation raises policy considerations not present 
in deciding whether to create tort remedies for harms arising in other contexts.”). 
 183 Id.; see also Nolte, supra note 155, at 398 (“[C]reation of a new cause of action [for 
spoliation] increases the likelihood of litigation. With an increase in lawsuits, social costs 
would necessarily escalate as well.”). 
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the filing of frivolous claims.184 Courts have found that derivative torts increase the 
filing of frivolous lawsuits because, in any lawsuit, evidence will inevitably be lost 
or unavailable and, as a result, spoliation torts invite disappointed litigants to 
essentially retry their cases.185  
In Cedars-Sinai Medical Center, the court suggested that recognizing 
independent torts for spoliation could over-burden the justice system: “To allow a 
litigant to attack the integrity of evidence after the proceedings have concluded . . . 
would impermissibly burden, if not inundate, our justice system.”186 The same court 
also recognized many similarities between spoliation and perjury, in that they both 
work to undermine judicial integrity and the fact-finding process.187 However, courts 
have long recognized that “it would be productive of endless litigation” to permit the 
victim of perjury to bring an independent cause of action for damages.188 The 
rationale behind not recognizing independent causes of action for perjury and 
spoliation rests on the concern that doing so would diminish judicial integrity by 
disregarding “the finality of adjudication.”189  
3. Adequacy of Traditional Remedies 
Along with the policy considerations discussed in the previous sections, most 
courts that have declined to recognize the various torts for spoliation have reasoned 
that traditional remedies are adequate to combat the destruction of evidence.190 In 
fact, a majority of state courts have found that traditional sanctions are a preferred 
remedy because they can be narrowly tailored to a specific set of circumstances,191 
and have noted that state legislatures remain free to create additional sanctions to 
combat spoliation as needed.192 In addition to sanctions, many states have criminal 
                                                                                                                                         
 184 See Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr., 954 P.2d at 515. 
 185 See id. 
 186 Id. at 516. 
 187 Id. (“Perjury, like spoliation, undermines the search for truth and fairness by creating a 
false picture of the evidence before the trier of fact.”); see also Levine, supra note 5, at 446 
(“Another reason given not to adopt the spoliation tort, and that can also be reduced to the 
court system’s desire to see an end to litigation, is that destruction of evidence is similar to 
perjury or embracery ‘in that both undermine the integrity of a trial; yet, there are no 
independent torts recognized for these crimes.’”). 
 188 Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr., 954 P.2d at 516 (quoting Smith v. Lewis, 3 Johns. 57, 168 
(N.Y. 1808)). 
 189 Id. at 516; see also id. at 517 (quoting Pico v. Cohn, 91 Cal. 129, 133-34 (1891)) 
(“Endless litigation, in which nothing was ever finally determined, would be worse than 
occasional miscarriages of justice . . . .”). 
 190 See supra note 135. 
 191 Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr., 954 P.2d at 515 (“[W]e have favored remedying litigation-
related misconduct by sanctions imposed within the underlying lawsuit rather than by creating 
new derivative torts.”); see also Levine, supra note 5, at 441 (“Perhaps the strongest argument 
against the adoption of most variations of the spoliation tort is that there are various remedies 
and claims already available that can sufficiently handle instances of spoliation of evidence.”). 
 192 See Judge, supra note 103, at 462. 
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statutes that address spoliation.193 Since the willful destruction of evidence does not 
appear to be widespread, the majority of courts have thus found that these remedies 
are generally adequate to address the problem of spoliation.194  
Specifically, courts reason that the adverse inference is the best way to both deter 
and remedy spoliation because it more appropriately places the victim in his original 
position by simply instructing the jury to infer that the evidence would have been 
favorable.195 In addition to the adverse inference, detractors of independent torts for 
spoliation argue that other sanctions, such as discovery and monetary sanctions, are 
powerful weapons to be used against spoliators.196 Thus, critics of the tort argue that 
victims of spoliation remain free to pursue a variety of remedies to provide proper 
compensation. 
4. Private Property Concerns 
Another problem with recognizing independent torts for spoliation is that, in 
many cases, the spoliated evidence will be a third party’s private property.197 
Obviously, this is especially problematic in cases of third party spoliation.198 In such 
cases, the third party is directed to preserve as evidence his own property.199 Since 
“[a] property owner normally has the right to control and dispose of his property as 
he sees fit[,] [t]he owner of the property may legitimately question what right a 
plaintiff has to direct control over such property.”200 Allowing claims for third party 
intentional spoliation may undermine the fundamental right of that party to control 
his own property as he sees fit.  
Additionally, aside from being unable to control one’s own property, there can be 
significant costs associated with the preservation of evidence. Specifically, the costs 
associated with “causing persons or entities to take extraordinary measures to 
                                                                                                                                         
 193 See supra note 58; see also Levine supra note 5, at 432. 
 194 Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr., 954 P.2d at 518 (“The infrequency of spoliation suggests that 
existing remedies are generally effective at deterring spoliation.”). 
 195 Id. (“There are a number of nontort remedies that seek to punish and deter the 
intentional spoliation of evidence. Chief among these is the evidentiary inference that 
evidence which one party has destroyed or rendered unavailable was unfavorable to that 
party.”); see also Levine, supra note 5, at 441 (“The spoliation inference . . . has been deemed 
superior to the tort on the grounds that is ‘more efficient, it avoids the horrors of derivative 
litigation, and it does the best job of fairly compensating the victimized party.’”). 
 196 See Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr., 954 P.2d at 517 (“The sanctions under Code of Civil 
Procedure section 2023 are potent. They include monetary sanctions, contempt sanctions, 
issue sanctions ordering that designated facts be taken as established or precluding the 
offending party from supporting or opposing designated claims or defenses, evidence 
sanctions prohibiting the offending party from introducing designated matters into evidence, 
and terminating sanctions that include striking part or all of the pleadings, dismissing part or 
all of the action, or granting a default judgment against the offending party.”). 
 197 See Bart S. Wilhoit, Spoliation of Evidence: The Viability of Four Emerging Torts, 46 
UCLA L. REV. 631, 671 (1998). 
 198 Id. 
 199 Id. 
 200 Oliver v. Stimson Lumber Co., 993 P.2d 11, 18 (Mont. 1999). 
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preserve for an indefinite period . . . things of no apparent value solely to avoid the 
possibility of spoliation liability if years later those items turn out to have some 
potential relevance to future litigation.”201 Critics of the spoliation torts argue that 
requiring third parties to preserve such evidence is simply too burdensome and that 
the lack of remedies for spoliation committed by third parties is over-exaggerated.202 
VI. OHIO LAW 
In 1993, Ohio became one of the few states to recognize independent causes of 
action for spoliation.203 Specifically, the Supreme Court of Ohio held, in Smith v. 
Howard Johnson Co., Inc., that Ohio recognizes separate causes of action for both 
first party and third party intentional spoliation.204 The court was not, however, clear 
as to whether the holding extended to negligent spoliation.205 
Although the court in Howard Johnson was directly asked whether Ohio 
recognizes intentional or negligent spoliation, whether the court actually extended its 
holding to include negligent spoliation is unclear.206 Instead, the court’s holding is 
ambiguous, simply stating: “[a] cause of action exists in tort for interference with or 
destruction of evidence.”207 Some appellate courts, however, have since addressed 
the issue and have found that Ohio does not recognize separate torts for negligent 
spoliation.208 
Typically, in Ohio, a claim for spoliation must be brought during the underlying 
cause of action.209 A case for intentional spoliation may be brought after the 
underlying suit only if the spoliation was discovered after the conclusion of the 
primary cause of action.210 The limitation on when a cause of action for spoliation 
may be brought is undoubtedly designed to alleviate some of the above-discussed 
policy concerns associated with derivative torts.211  
VII. ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The following section will analyze the merits of the policy considerations 
discussed in the previous sections and will apply them to the various types of 
spoliation torts. Specifically, in light of these policy arguments, the following section 
                                                                                                                                         
 201 Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr., 954 P.2d at 519. 
 202 See Judge, supra note 103, at 459. 
 203 See generally Smith v. Howard Johnson Co., Inc., 615 N.E.2d 1037 (Ohio 1993). 
 204 Id. 
 205 See id.  
 206 Id. 
 207 Id. at 1038. 
 208 See Woodell v. Ormet Primary Aluminum Corp., No. 03 MO 7, 2005 WL 2033285 
(Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 19, 2005); see also Drawl v. Cornicelli, 706 N.E.2d 849 (Ohio Ct. App. 
1997). 
 209 See Davis v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 756 N.E.2d 657, 660 (Ohio 2001). 
 210 Id. 
 211 See id.  
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will explore whether Ohio should recognize any of the different causes of action for 
spoliation.  
A. Ohio Should Cease to Recognize Independent Torts for Intentional Spoliation of 
Evidence 
Ohio should overturn its recognition of torts for both first and third party 
intentional spoliation. In recognizing separate causes of action for spoliation, it 
appears that Ohio fell into the same trap as California and Florida. Namely, being 
overzealous to recognize new tort remedies without fully considering the problems 
posed by their recognition. Conspicuously lacking in the court’s one page opinion in 
Howard Johnson, is any discussion of the policy considerations discussed in the 
previous section.212 What is clear, however, is that those policy considerations weigh 
against recognizing independent tort remedies for intentional spoliation. The 
following section will seek to prove that the problems associated with recognizing 
torts for intentional spoliation far outweigh the benefits.  
1. Recognizing Independent Torts for Intentional Spoliation Does Little to Further 
Deter the Willful Destruction of Evidence 
One of the main rationales employed by proponents of the independent tort for 
intentional spoliation is that the tort will help to further deter the willful destruction 
of evidence.213 Proponents argue that traditional remedies do not adequately deter 
spoliation because the penalties are not harsh enough,214 as they do not extend to pre-
trial litigation and criminal statutes are rarely enforced.215  
While discovery sanctions do not extend to pre-trial spoliation, courts 
nonetheless have the inherent authority to impose a wide variety of sanctions and are 
typically given broad discretion to do so.216 These sanctions include monetary 
sanctions that can be multiplied for punitive purposes, adverse inferences, default 
judgment, and dismissal, among others.217 It is difficult to imagine that there exists 
any harsher penalty than default judgment or dismissal, especially considering that 
monetary penalties also remain available for punitive purposes.218 Additionally, as 
the court in Cedars-Sinai Medical Center noted, although the discovery sanctions 
generally do not extend to pre-trial spoliation, the vast majority of spoliation occurs 
during discovery.219 Thus, “there is no reason to conclude that instances of spoliation 
that remain hidden during discovery . . . would come to light afterward solely 
[because] of the existence of a tort remedy.”220 Furthermore, given the tort’s 
                                                                                                                                         
 212 See generally Smith v. Howard Johnson Co., Inc., 615 N.E.2d 1037 (Ohio 1993). 
 213 See supra Part V.A.2.  
 214 See supra Part V.A.2. 
 215 See supra Part V.A.2.  
 216 See supra Part III.A.  
 217 See supra Part III.A.  
 218 See supra Parts III.A.2, 4. 
 219 See Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Super. Ct., 954 P.2d 511, 520-21 (Cal. 1998). 
 220 Id.  
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speculative nature,221 it is unlikely that tort remedies would increase deterrence “by 
more accurately compensating the spoliation victim and thus reducing the benefit to 
the spoliator.”222 
In most jurisdictions, prosecutors also maintain the right to prosecute intentional 
spoliators.223 Just because they are reluctant to do so, does not justify the creation of 
independent torts for spoliation. Furthermore, state legislatures are also free to create 
further sanctions that would help deter future spoliation. Creating a separate cause of 
action for first party intentional spoliation, therefore, is unnecessary because it will 
not be of any greater deterrence than traditional remedies. 
However, the deterrence rational does apply with more force to intentional third 
party spoliation because many of the traditional sanctions available against a party to 
the lawsuit are not available against third parties.224 “This issue is particularly 
important to tort proponents because it is really their last line of defense—without a 
spoliation tort, there may be no civil remedy to compensate a litigant who is 
victimized by a nonparty spoliator.”225 
Although a number of jurisdictions, including the District of Columbia, Alabama, 
and Montana, have accepted this rationale, it is generally unfounded.226 Courts have 
noted that in most instances where a third party spoliator intentionally destroys 
evidence, he will not be a complete stranger to the litigation and will have some 
stake in the outcome of the case.227 Otherwise, the third party would have little, if 
any, incentive to intentionally destroy evidence important to the litigation.228 In fact, 
California appears to be one of the only states that have confronted a case involving 
                                                                                                                                         
 221 See supra Part V.B.1.  
 222 See Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr., 954 P.2d at 521. 
 223 See supra Part III.B.  
 224 See generally Oliver v. Stimson Lumber Co., 993 P.2d 11, 17-18 (Mont. 1999) (“When 
evidence is in possession of a third party . . . the various sanctions available to the trial judge 
are inapplicable and other considerations arise.”). See also Levine, supra note 5, at 445 
(“[Traditional] remedies . . . appear to be at least as adequate as a tort for spoliation of 
evidence would be and account for all instances of spoliation except for intentional spoliation 
by a third party.”); see also Judge, supra note 103, at 459 (“Unlike spoliation by parties to the 
lawsuit, which can be neutralized and punished with an evidentiary inference, sanctions or 
both, nonparties are generally not subject to these remedies.”). 
 225 Judge, supra note 103, at 459. 
 226 See Oliver, 993 P.2d 11 (recognizing cause of action for third party intentional 
spoliation and third party negligent spoliation); see also Holmes v. Amrex Rent-A-Car, 180 F. 
3d 294 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (recognizing independent tort for negligent third-party spoliation); 
Smith v. Atkinson, 771 So. 2d. 429 (Ala. 2000) (recognizing cause of action for third party 
negligent spoliation); Judge, supra note 103, at 459. 
 227 See Dowdle Butane Gas Co. v. Moore, 831 So. 2d 1124, 1132 (Miss. 2002) (discussing 
Cedars-Sinai Medical Center v. Superior Court); see also Judge, supra note 103, at 461 
(“[T]he chance that valuable evidence will end up in the possession of someone with 
absolutely no interest in litigation between the primary parties is extremely slim.”). 
 228 Dowdle Butane Gas Co., 831 So. 2d at 1132 (“[I]n many instances . . . the third party 
spoliator may not be a total stranger to the litigation, as there is little motivation to spoliate 
where the third party is wholly divorced from the litigation.”). 
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an uninterested third party at all.229 Instead, it is far more likely that a third party will 
have some sort of agency relationship with one of the litigants, in which case 
sanctions may be imputed to that litigant.230 For example, where a party’s expert 
witness destroys or alters evidence, the court may impose the sanction of evidence 
preclusion and forbid the expert from testifying on what that evidence may or may 
not have shown.231   
As indicated above, the need for an independent tort for third party intentional 
spoliation is largely exaggerated. Courts that have realized this exaggeration have 
shown that there are traditional remedies available to victims of third party spoliation 
and that the victim is not “entirely helpless.”232 In the rare case where a third party 
intentional spoliator is a complete stranger to litigation, monetary and contempt 
sanctions are available to deter future spoliators.233 Furthermore, if the plaintiff truly 
faces a situation where a third party is in possession of valuable evidence, the 
plaintiff could arguably still resort to “quasi-in-rem jurisdiction, and essentially file 
suit against the piece of evidence itself.”234 The plaintiff could then seek a 
preliminary injunction or even a temporary restraining order against the party in 
possession of the evidence, which would force them to preserve it.235 Lastly, 
although prosecutors are often reluctant to pursue criminal charges against a 
spoliator in civil litigation,236 they remain free to do so against third parties, while 
allowing the trial judge to handle spoliation issues that arise between the parties of 
the underlying suit. Thus, the fear that there are little or no remedies in place to 
adequately deter intentional third-party spoliation is clearly without basis.  
2. The Derivative Nature of the Torts Poses Problems that Far Outweigh Any 
Benefits Associated with Recognizing Independent Torts for Intentional Spoliation 
As discussed above, one of the main rationales behind the recognition of 
independent torts for intentional spoliation is that tort law is constantly coming up 
with “new and nameless” torts to compensate victims that have been wronged.237 
However, courts also have a longstanding policy against recognizing derivative torts 
based on litigation-related misconduct.238 This policy concern is rooted in procedural 
concerns that are not present with traditional tort remedies.239  
                                                                                                                                         
 229 Judge, supra note 103, at 459. 
 230 Id. (“[T]he laws of agency typically will allow the court to impute sanctions to one of 
the parties.”). 
 231 Id. 
 232 Temple Cmty. Hosp. v. Super. Ct., 976 P.2d 223, 232 (Cal. 1999). 
 233 Id.  
 234 Judge, supra note 103, at 461. 
 235 Id. 
 236 See supra Part V.A.II.  
 237 See supra Part V.A.I.  
 238 See supra Part V.B.II.  
 239 Cedars-Sinai Med, Ctr. v. Super. Ct., 954 P.2d 511, 514-15 (Cal. 1998). 
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Specifically, derivative torts work to prolong litigation and “encourage[] a spiral 
of lawsuits.”240 Derivative tort remedies for intentional spoliation are also subject to 
abuse because in many cases, potentially relevant evidence will no longer be 
available at the time of trial simply because it was inadvertently lost or misplaced.241 
The mere fact that evidence is unavailable allows disappointed litigants to sue the 
prevailing party for spoliation, regardless of whether the evidence was lost or 
destroyed intentionally.242 This appears to be the case in Ohio, as a non-exhaustive 
look at spoliation cases in the state appears to show that the vast majority of claims 
fail to make it past summary judgment on the issue of willful spoliation.243 It appears 
that California’s fear that allowing independent torts for spoliation “would 
impermissibly burden, if not inundate our justice system” may be coming to fruition 
in Ohio.244 Since it appears that very few spoliation cases are actually successful in 
Ohio, the argument that a large quantity of spoliation victims will go 
uncompensated, if not for the tort, loses much of its luster.  
Furthermore, even in the rare case where the plaintiff does have a meritorious 
cause of action for spoliation, there are a number of additional problems associated 
with the torts. Aside from the policy issues discussed above, there are also 
procedural issues that come along with recognizing derivative tort remedies, and 
                                                                                                                                         
 240 Id. at 515. 
 241 Id. at 519 (“A separate tort remedy would be subject to abuse, for in many cases 
potentially relevant evidence will no longer exist at the time of trial, not because it was 
intentionally destroyed but simply because it has been discarded or misplaced in the ordinary 
course of events.”). 
 242 Id. at 520 (“The mere fact of destruction . . . would permit a disappointed litigant to sue 
the prevailing party for spoliation, [even though] in many cases the issue of the defendant's 
purpose in destroying the evidence [is uncertain] . . . .”); see also James F. Thompson, 
Spoliation of Evidence: A Troubling New Tort, 37 U. KAN. L. REV. 563, 592 (1989) (“A new 
cause of action could accrue each time a plaintiff loses a lawsuit, for in most cases there is 
likely to be some place of potential evidence that is not available at the time of trial.”). 
 243 See Thomas v. Cleveland Clinic Found., No. 85276, 2005 WL 2100922 (Ohio Ct. App. 
Sept. 1, 2005) (affirming directed verdict because failed to show evidence destroyed 
willfully); see also Sivinski v. Kelley, No. 94296, 2011 WL 1744262 (Ohio Ct. App. May 5, 
2011); Allstate Ins. Co. v. QED Consultants, Inc., No. 09CA14, 2009 WL 2973503 (Ohio Ct. 
App. Sept. 16, 2009) (finding plaintiff failed to show willful spoliation); Mitchell v. Norwalk 
Area Health Servs., No. H-05-002, 2004 WL 2415995 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 30, 2005) (finding 
no evidence destruction of evidence done willfully); Woodell v. Ormet Primary Aluminum 
Corp., No. 03 MO 7, 2005 WL 2033285 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 19, 2005); Bugg v. Am. 
Standard, Inc., No. 84829, 2005 WL 1245043 (Ohio Ct. App. May 26, 2005) (finding plaintiff 
failed to show third element that evidence destroyed willfully); Boggs v. The Scotts Co., No. 
04AP-425, 2005 WL 647560 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 22, 2005) (finding no support for claim 
defendant deliberately destroyed evidence); Wachtman v. Meijer, No. 03AP-948, 2004 WL 
2757832 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 2, 2004) (finding plaintiff failed to allege willful destruction of 
evidence); Ciganick v. Kaley, No. 2004-P-0001, 2004 WL 2580593 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 12, 
2004) (finding plaintiff failed to show spoliation was willful); Tate v. Adena Reg’l Med. Ctr., 
801 N.E. 2d. 930 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003) (finding plaintiff failed to show destruction was 
willful); White v. Ford Motor Co., 755 N.E. 2d. 954 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001) (finding plaintiff 
failed to show evidence willfully destroyed). But see White v. Equity, Inc., 945 N.E. 2d. 536 
(Ohio Ct. App. 2010) (finding plaintiff set forth claim for spoliation).  
 244 See Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr., 954 P.2d at 516. 
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specifically, torts for spoliation. Mainly, states vary at what point a cause of action 
for spoliation against a party to the underlying claim may be brought. Ohio typically 
only allows the spoliation tort to be brought during the underlying action unless the 
spoliation is not discovered until after the underlying suit has concluded.245 Other 
states, however, allow the tort for spoliation to be brought after the underlying suit 
regardless of when the spoliation was discovered.246 
Although requiring the suit to be brought during the underlying cause of action 
necessarily hastens the litigation process, it also poses other problems, such as jury 
confusion and inconsistency.247 Jury confusion occurs because the jury must decide 
two different claims, with overlapping issues and evidence, at the same time.248 This 
process begins with the jury first having to decide the underlying claim and whether 
to apply an adverse inference to the spoliated evidence.249 In deciding the underlying 
claim, one of two decisions can be made: (1) application of the adverse inference is 
warranted; or (2) application of the adverse inference is unwarranted.250 Either way 
the decision turns, it appears, at least theoretically, that an alleged spoliation victim 
should not be able to recover under the spoliation tort if the jury is consistent.251  
For example, if the application of the adverse inference is warranted, it 
necessarily must have been decided that the evidence was both significant and 
destroyed intentionally.252 Once the adverse inference is granted, in order to show 
damages in the subsequent tort claim, the alleged spoliation victim must lose the 
underlying case, despite the granting of the adverse inference.253 However, in 
deciding that the spoliation victim still loses, it must have necessarily been decided 
that, despite inferring a reasonable interpretation of what the evidence would have 
shown, the spoliation victim still cannot state a claim.254 If the jury is consistent 
during the subsequent spoliation tort, it appears it necessarily must decide that the 
missing evidence was not the proximate cause of the victim losing the underlying 
case because it assumed the missing evidence’s importance and veracity and the 
spoliation victim still lost.255 Thus, it appears that if the adverse inference is granted 
                                                                                                                                         
 245 See supra Part VI. 
 246 See Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr., 954 P.2d at 516. 
 247 Id. at 520. 
 248 See id.  
 249 Id. 
 250 Id. 
 251 See id.  
 252 See supra Part III.A.1 (Courts will generally find the granting of an adverse inference 
appropriate only if the following elements are satisfied: “(1) an act of destruction; (2) 
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 253 See supra Part IV (All forms of the spoliation tort require the alleged victim to lose the 
underlying suit in order to show damages.). 
 254 See Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr., 954 P.2d at 520. 
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at all during the underlying claim, the alleged spoliation victim should not be able to 
prevail during the subsequent tort action if the jury is consistent. 
If, however, it is decided that application of the adverse inference in the 
underlying suit is unwarranted, it must have necessarily been found that either the 
spoliation was unintentional or the evidence was insignificant. 256 If the spoliation 
was unintentional, then the alleged spoliation victim cannot bring an independent 
tort in Ohio because Ohio only recognizes intentional spoliation as a separate 
claim.257 Likewise, if the evidence is not significant enough to warrant the adverse 
inference, then it most likely is not the proximate cause of the alleged victim’s 
failure to prove his case.258 Again, if the jury is consistent during the subsequent tort 
action, then it appears that a spoliation victim should not be able to prevail if the 
adverse inference is found to be unwarranted either.259 Thus, theoretically, if the jury 
is consistent during the subsequent tort claim, the spoliation plaintiff should not 
recover regardless of the scenario. “At the least, this would be confusing to the jury; 
at most, it would lead to inconsistent results.”260   
As demonstrated above, trying a tort case for spoliation simultaneously with the 
underlying claim poses multiple problems; however, requiring the tort case for 
spoliation to commence after the underlying suit is also problematic because it 
prolongs litigation. The spoliation action would essentially be a retrial of the 
underlying claim because all of the evidence would have to be presented again for 
the jury to properly determine the effect that the spoliated evidence would have had 
on the outcome of the case.261 In sum, it appears that, although in some instances 
spoliation torts might advance judicial integrity, the vast majority of cases will only 
serve to overwhelm our justice system and drain its resources.  
3. Traditional Methods are Better at Accurately Compensating Victims of Intentional 
Spoliation Because the Tort is Inherently Speculative 
Supporters of independent torts for intentional spoliation also argue that the torts 
promote judicial integrity by providing remedies to compensate victims where they 
may not otherwise be available.262 However, just because the torts “compensate” 
victims, does not mean that they promote judicial integrity by doing so accurately. 
As critics of the intentional spoliation tort have suggested, the speculative nature of 
the torts not only calls into question whether the plaintiff was in fact harmed by the 
spoliation, it also is speculative as to the amount of damages that should be 
awarded.263 Furthermore, critics of the spoliation tort have noted that the inherently 
speculative nature of the tort may lead to erroneous decisions, windfall for the 
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plaintiff, and inconsistency.264 For example, theoretically, in cases of third-party 
spoliation, both parties could file suit against a third party and, because of the 
speculative nature of the tort, both could argue that the evidence would have been 
favorable to him.265 As a result, the majority of courts have found that traditional 
methods of combatting spoliation are superior to the spoliation torts.266 
Specifically, the adverse inference more accurately compensates victims of 
spoliation and thus is a superior remedy for cases of intentional spoliation.267 The 
adverse inference more accurately places the party in its original position, rather than 
obsessing over creating a separate remedy.268 Instead of seeking to provide a remedy 
that is speculative at best, the adverse inference “gives the aggrieved party the 
benefit of the doubt created,” which allows the jury to assess the proper remedy.269 
In addition to the adverse inference, courts have broad discretion to tailor other 
remedies to the specific circumstances of the case, including issue preclusion and 
monetary sanctions.270 In egregious cases, where an adverse inference and monetary 
sanctions are not enough, courts are also free to dismiss the case or enter default 
judgment.271 Thus, there is little reason to recognize a separate cause of action for 
first party intentional spoliation. 
As discussed above, although many of the traditional sanctions do not apply to 
third parties, it is extremely unlikely that a third party with absolutely no ties to the 
underlying claim will be in possession of crucial evidence.272 Furthermore, if the 
party has absolutely no stake in the underlying cause of action there is little 
motivation for a third party to intentionally destroy evidence.273 Traditional 
sanctions, therefore, can serve to adequately compensate victims of third party 
intentional spoliation. As a result, Ohio would be wise to overrule its decision in 
Howard Johnson and stop recognizing both first and third party intentional 
spoliation. 
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B. Ohio Should Not Recognize Independent Torts for Negligent Spoliation of 
Evidence 
So far, Ohio has refused to recognize causes of action for first and third party 
negligent spoliation,274 and it should continue to do so. Although some of the 
problems that arise with intentional spoliation are not present when it comes to 
negligent spoliation, many of the same, and additional problems, are associated with 
negligent spoliation. These problems will be discussed below in relation to the 
policy arguments asserted by proponents of negligent spoliation. 
Although an argument can be made that independent torts for intentional 
spoliation are necessary to further deter future spoliation, that argument has little, if 
any, merit for claims of negligent spoliation. Commentators have found that “tort 
liability for negligent acts adds little to deterrence because most individuals are 
rarely involved in tortious situations and, therefore, have little incentive to learn how 
to avoid tortious behavior.”275 Thus, the idea that creation of an independent tort for 
negligent spoliation will cause people to be more careful with evidence is tenuous at 
best.  
Moreover, creation of independent torts for negligent spoliation would create 
unnecessary duties on individuals to preserve evidence.276 A third party in 
possession of potentially relevant evidence would be forced to carefully preserve that 
evidence even though it ultimately may have no bearing on the case.277 Otherwise, 
he may be opening himself up to potential litigation even though the evidence was 
not destroyed for the purpose of disrupting the party’s case.278 Furthermore, in cases 
where evidence is the personal property of a third party, the court would be 
interfering with that party’s right to use his property as he sees fit. 279 New torts for 
negligent spoliation, therefore, would be “too expansive and impose an unreasonable 
duty on property owners to maintain their personal property.”280 As a result, other 
remedies are far more appropriate to combat the negligent destruction of evidence. 
However, like with intentional spoliation, supporters argue that traditional 
methods used to combat negligent spoliation are inadequate because, in most states, 
the adverse inference is not available in cases of negligent spoliation.281 Some states, 
however, including Ohio, have extended the possibility of an adverse inference to 
cases involving gross negligence.282 But, courts do remain free to use the adverse 
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inference as a way to compensate victims of spoliation, rather than as a “punishment 
device.”283 By looking more to the importance of the missing evidence, as opposed 
to the intent of the party, the adverse inference could be expanded to include cases of 
negligent spoliation.284 Thus, the adverse inference can still be an effective tool in 
combatting negligent spoliation if courts choose to extend its use to certain instances 
of negligence.285 
Unlike third party intentional spoliation, however, it does not necessarily follow 
that a third party in a negligent spoliation claim will have some stake in the 
underlying suit. Although there is little motivation to intentionally destroy evidence 
if a party has no stake in the underlying suit,286 a party could have absolutely no 
stake in the litigation and accidentally spoliate evidence. This, however, is also 
highly unlikely because the third party must have undertaken some duty to preserve 
the evidence. Furthermore, even if Ohio were to decide that an additional remedy for 
third-party negligent spoliation is necessary, there is no reason to create an entirely 
separate cause of action. Instead, several courts have found that “a simple negligence 
claim is fully capable of covering instances of negligent spoliation” and “that a 
negligent spoliation claim is essentially a disguised negligence claim .”287 Thus, 
there is simply no need for Ohio to recognize either first or third party negligent 
spoliation as independent torts. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
In light of the discussion above, Ohio should not recognize independent torts for 
spoliation because the torts are inherently speculative, their derivative nature 
prolongs litigation and invites frivolous claims, and traditional sanctions and 
criminal statutes are adequate to remedy and deter spoliation. Even with the many 
problems, however, a small number of proponents continue to justify the torts under 
the rationale that for every wrong there should be a remedy. Although an admirable 
goal, the problems that come along with the spoliation torts make their recognition 
imprudent. 
The torts are inherently speculative because, by their very nature, it is impossible 
for juries to determine exactly what the destroyed or altered evidence would have 
shown or how it would have effected a party’s case. Thus, at the very least, the jury 
is forced to take an educated guess as to what the evidence would have shown and 
how the underlying case would have been effected by that evidence. As a result, 
traditional remedies, such as the adverse inference, more accurately compensate 
victims of spoliation and decrease the likelihood of erroneous decisions and 
wrongful recoveries. 
Moreover, because the tort is a derivative tort, it unnecessarily prolongs litigation 
and invites spurious claims. Frequently in litigation, evidence is lost or destroyed 
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regardless of the level of care used by the parties. Thus, the torts invite disappointed 
litigants, in almost any case, to bring frivolous claims that the evidence was 
destroyed intentionally when, in reality, it was destroyed inadvertently. Although 
meritorious spoliation claims are possible, any good provided by the tort is vastly 
outweighed by the economic burden it places on the courts by encouraging frivolous 
claims and prolonging underlying litigation.  
 This burden is also unnecessary considering the adequacy of various sanctions 
designed to combat spoliation and the fact that these sanctions can be narrowly 
tailored to the specific circumstances of each case.  
Additionally, courts remain free to expand these traditional methods and state 
legislatures are free to create entirely new sanctions. Ohio should, therefore, join the 
vast majority of states in declining to recognize derivative spoliation torts in all of 
their forms.  
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